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The Afghan Taliban have been ruling Afghanistan for the past five years. There may be peace after four decades of anarchy, yet the country lacks political legitimacy or regional stability. Instead, Afghanistan remains trapped in a cycle of economic collapse, diplomatic isolation, ideological rigidity, and international uncertainty.
The Taliban frequently cite the restoration of nationwide security as their greatest achievement. Indeed, compared with the years of civil war and foreign military intervention, ordinary Afghans today experience fewer large-scale battles. For many families, travelling between provinces has become safer than it was during the republic.
Yet security alone does not define a successful state. Peace without accountable governance, economic opportunity, political participation and respect for basic rights remains fragile.
Five years into Taliban rule, Afghanistan still has no constitution, no elected institutions, no recognised mechanism of political accountability and no inclusive system of governance. Real authority remains concentrated in the hands of Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, while policymaking is driven more by ideological interpretation than institutional governance.
The most visible casualty has been Afghan women. Girls remain excluded from secondary and higher education, women face sweeping restrictions on employment and public life, and half of Afghanistan’s human capital remains largely excluded from national development.
This is no longer merely a human rights issue; it has become a question of Afghanistan’s future viability. A country cannot modernise while deliberately denying education to half its population. Imagine if there are no female doctors in a conservative Afghan society. However, it seems the Taliban leadership is oblivious of this stark reality and does not seem to be taking serious steps.
An equally important question concerns legitimacy. Five years later, except for Russia, no other country has formally recognised the Afghan Taliban government. The absence of recognition is not simply diplomatic symbolism; it limits foreign investment, banking, development assistance and Afghanistan’s integration into regional economic initiatives.
This raises an uncomfortable question for the international community. If recognition depends upon specific political, security and human rights benchmarks, those conditions should be clearly articulated. The US Security Council should clearly spell out the measures the Taliban would be required to fulfil. Ambiguity serves neither Afghanistan nor regional stability. Transparent benchmarks would provide incentives for compliance while allowing the international community to judge progress objectively.
For Pakistan, however, the anniversary carries an entirely different significance. Islamabad had initially hoped that the departure of foreign forces and the Taliban’s return would produce a friendly government capable of stabilising the shared border. Those expectations have largely evaporated.
Pakistan’s principal concern today is not ideological differences with Kabul but cross-border terrorism. The persistence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sanctuaries inside Afghanistan has fundamentally altered bilateral relations. The Taliban’s repeated assertion that the TTP is ‘Pakistan’s problem’ has only deepened distrust. Mediation efforts by China, Qatar, Turkiye and Saudi Arabia have failed to bridge this divide because the core issue of neutralising the TTP remains unresolved. On the contrary, the Taliban leadership seems to prefer the TTP over its relations with Pakistan.
This stalemate has carried substantial economic costs. Border closures, declining trade and disrupted transit have inflicted losses on both countries. Pakistan has lost export markets, while Afghan traders have suffered equally from reduced access to Pakistani ports and Indian markets. Geography continues to dictate an inescapable reality: Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot relocate; they must ultimately learn to coexist.
The Taliban also face a strategic dilemma of their own making. Despite repeated assurances under the Doha Agreement that Afghan territory would not be used against other countries, successive UN reports continue to express concern over the presence of numerous terrorist organisations inside Afghanistan.
Whether every allegation is accepted or disputed, the perception itself discourages investment, delays diplomatic recognition and heightens regional anxieties. Afghanistan cannot expect international legitimacy while questions persist regarding terrorist safe havens.
Pakistan, meanwhile, should also draw lessons from the past five years. Islamabad cannot and should not assume responsibility for transforming Afghanistan’s internal political or social order. Whether the Taliban choose constitutional governance, permit girls’ education or expand women’s participation ultimately remains a decision for Afghanistan’s rulers and people. Pakistan’s foreign policy should be guided by national interests rather than expectations of ideological convergence. That does not mean disengagement.
Pakistan’s interests require a stable Afghanistan. Likewise, Afghanistan cannot achieve economic recovery without constructive relations with Pakistan. The alternative is perpetual confrontation, shrinking trade, expanding militant networks and greater opportunities for external powers to exploit bilateral mistrust. Moreover, Afghanistan may plunge into anarchy, which no one wants to happen. Looking ahead, policy should rest on five practical principles.
First, both governments should institutionalise intelligence-sharing and establish a jointly verifiable counterterrorism mechanism to address cross-border militant activity. Foreign ministries of the two countries should engage in bilateral dialogue.
Second, trade should gradually be insulated from political disputes. The trade benefits ordinary citizens on both sides and creates constituencies for peace. Third, structured dialogue should replace crisis diplomacy. Regular meetings between security officials, foreign ministries and border authorities would reduce misunderstandings before they escalate.
Fourth, a regional approach with stakeholders such as China, Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye can facilitate confidence-building measures that lead towards peace and stability in Afghanistan. In fact, the Moscow Format or SCO offer the appropriate platforms to address thorny issues, including Afghanistan’s stability.
Finally, the international community should bring in policy clarity on Afghanistan. Clear benchmarks regarding diplomatic recognition, linked to progress in counterterrorism, inclusive governance, and fundamental rights, should be publicly defined and consistently applied by the UN Security Council.
Five years after the Taliban’s return, Afghanistan has undoubtedly achieved greater physical security than during decades of war. But peace alone cannot sustain a nation. Durable stability requires accountable institutions, economic opportunity, responsible regional behaviour and international legitimacy.
The next five years should not be spent debating whether the Taliban won the war. That question was settled in 2021. The real challenge now is whether they can build a state that earns the confidence of their own people, reassures their neighbours and secures a respected place in the international community.
Otherwise, Afghanistan risks remaining at peace with itself only superficially while continuing to export insecurity beyond its borders.
The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Iran and the UAE. He is also a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan and currently serves as a senior research fellow at th9e Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).
