The withdrawal of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 marked the end of a 20-year military campaign, but it did not bring an end to the international community’s legal responsibilities towards Afghanistan.
Military disengagement by one coalition cannot extinguish obligations created under the UN Charter. If anything, the departure of foreign troops made the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) even more consequential.
Nearly five years after the Taliban returned to power, Afghanistan is still at the crossroads of humanitarian catastrophe, political isolation and persistent security concerns. While the world’s attention has shifted to Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan and other crises, Afghanistan risks becoming another forgotten conflict until the next terrorist attack reminds the international community of its unfinished business. Such complacency would be a grave mistake.
The Security Council’s counterterrorism framework – particularly Resolutions 1267, 1368, 1373, 1988 and 1989 – remains fully operative. These resolutions were not adopted merely to facilitate the US-led intervention following the attacks of September 11, 2001. They were intended to establish a durable international framework to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a sanctuary for transnational terrorist organizations.
The legal obligation is unambiguous. Article 25 of the U.N. Charter requires all member states to “accept and carry out” decisions of the Security Council. Under Chapter VII, the council possesses the authority to determine threats to international peace and security and to adopt binding measures, including sanctions, travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargoes and other enforcement actions.
Unlike General Assembly resolutions, Chapter VII decisions are not political recommendations; they are binding obligations under international law. It is also important that the UN member states should be transparent while financially helping the Taliban. They should ensure that the money does not support terrorist organisations such as the TTP.
These obligations do not expire because foreign troops have departed. Nor do they lapse because geopolitical priorities have changed. This is precisely why the Security Council’s sanctions architecture continues to matter. The 1267 and 1988 Sanctions Committees, supported by their respective Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Teams, remain the principal international mechanisms for assessing terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. Their reports are expected to provide objective, evidence-based assessments of the presence, capabilities and activities of terrorist organisations operating on Afghan soil. Their credibility is therefore indispensable.
If these assessments understate realities on the ground or become swayed by political considerations, the entire sanctions regime risks losing legitimacy. Policymakers cannot formulate effective counterterrorism strategies unless they are guided by accurate intelligence and impartial reporting. Regional security – and indeed international security – depends upon the integrity of these monitoring mechanisms.
Equally important is the accountability of the Afghan Taliban themselves. Whether recognised or not, the Taliban exercise effective control over Afghanistan. Under international law, de-facto authorities exercising governmental functions cannot escape responsibilities simply because they lack diplomatic recognition. Since assuming power, Taliban leaders have repeatedly assured neighbouring countries and the wider international community that Afghan territory would not be used against other states. These assurances cannot remain matters of faith. They must be measured against verifiable evidence.
The Security Council should therefore continue to evaluate the Taliban’s compliance with their counterterrorism commitments, including action against TTP, ETIM, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and other designated terrorist organisations whose activities continue to concern Afghanistan’s neighbours and the wider international community.
History offers ample precedent for such scrutiny. The UN has consistently enforced Security Council decisions against states and authorities that failed to comply with international obligations. Iraq faced comprehensive sanctions and ultimately collective military action following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Libya remained under UN sanctions until it complied with Security Council demands regarding the Lockerbie bombing investigation. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia faced extensive sanctions during the Balkan conflicts.
Iran was subjected to years of multilateral sanctions under Security Council resolutions concerning its nuclear programme before negotiations produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). North Korea continues to face one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes in modern history because of its persistent violations of Security Council resolutions.
The principle underlying each of these cases is identical: Security Council decisions must be implemented consistently to retain credibility. Afghanistan should neither receive exceptional leniency nor be subjected to exceptional treatment. It should simply be judged according to the same legal standards applied elsewhere.
This consistency becomes even more important when viewed alongside another unresolved question: international recognition of the Taliban. Nearly five years after their return to Kabul, no member state has formally recognised the Islamic Emirate as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Yet the international community has never articulated, with sufficient clarity, what precise conditions continue to prevent such recognition.
If recognition depends upon severing ties with terrorist organisations, implementing an inclusive political order, respecting the rights of women and girls, honouring international commitments, or complying with Security Council resolutions, those benchmarks should be publicly stated. Strategic ambiguity serves neither Afghanistan nor the international community.
Transparent conditions would provide measurable incentives for compliance while enabling the international community to pursue a coherent policy rather than one characterised by selective engagement and diplomatic uncertainty. Afghanistan deserves neither abandonment nor indefinite limbo. Its people continue to endure economic hardship, humanitarian deprivation and political isolation.
At the same time, neighbouring states remain legitimately concerned about cross-border terrorism, extremist networks and regional instability. These two realities are not mutually exclusive. The international community must simultaneously support the Afghan people while insisting upon compliance with international law and counterterrorism obligations.
The UN cannot afford to retreat into irrelevance simply because the US and its allies have withdrawn. The credibility of the Security Council has never rested solely upon its ability to adopt resolutions; it rests equally upon its willingness to ensure that those resolutions are implemented impartially, transparently and consistently.
The US may have left Afghanistan. Nato may have ended its mission. But the UN remains bound by its Charter and by its own resolutions. Until Afghanistan no longer poses a threat to regional and international peace and security, the Security Council’s responsibility endures.
The question is no longer whether the UN has a legal obligation to remain engaged. The Charter provides the answer. The real question is whether the Security Council still possesses the political will to uphold the very resolutions it adopted.
The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Iran and the UAE. He is also a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan and currently serves as a senior research fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).
