It is rare for one head of government to order the death of another. Yet on February 28th America’s president and Israel’s prime minister did just that, killing Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reports The Economist.
The decapitation of the Iranian regime reflects the devastating operational success of “Operation Epic Fury”. But Khamenei’s place was immediately taken by a triumvirate. The next supreme leader could be named soon—perhaps his own son unless he, too, is killed. That augurs something more subtle and worrying: that the operation is failing to achieve its political goals, writes The Economist.
In this war, Israel’s aim is clear: to demolish the threat posed by Iran’s regime. By contrast, Trump and his cabinet have offered a mess of shifting assertions—about Iran’s missiles, nuclear weapons, regime change, following Israel’s lead, a “feeling” Iran was about to attack and settling scores after decades of enmity. Politically, vagueness gives Trump room for manoeuvre. Strategically, his failure to say what Epic Fury is for is its biggest vulnerability.
One is that other countries are being sucked in. Iran has attacked the Gulf states, which have bet their future on being havens from the chaos gripping the rest of the Middle East. Fighting has also erupted in Lebanon as Israel smashes Hizbullah, Iran’s main proxy. France and Britain will defend their bases from attack. On March 4th, NATO air defences shot down an Iranian missile bound for Turkey.
Another consequence is economic. Iran has tried to shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off perhaps 20% of global oil supplies. The price of Brent crude is up by 14% since February 27th, to $83 a barrel. A megawatt-hour of natural gas in Europe costs €54 ($63), over 70% more than last week. As Asian buyers scramble for supplies, prices could go higher. The global economy could yet suffer a hit. If oil reaches $100 a barrel, GDP growth could be lowered by 0.4 percentage points and inflation raised by 1.2 points.
The third potential consequence is chaos inside Iran. America and Israel are putting pressure on the regime by backing Kurdish insurgents. The risk is that Trump cannot bear to quit so long as the markets and polls deny him the acclamation he craves—and that may last for as long as Iran can release even sporadic missiles and drones. Today barely a third of Americans favour the battle in Iran (90% backed invading Afghanistan in 2001). America may be an energy exporter, but its voters detest costly petrol. He may be tempted to seek an undeniable win by bombing the regime out of existence. But even with America’s military clout, he might not succeed. Meanwhile all those risks would continue to harm the region and the world economy.
Trump would do better to narrow his war aims. His goal should be to degrade Iran’s military capabilities and then stop. But it would be better for America to declare victory early than limp out of an unpopular war because of exhaustion.
These are the fruits of Trump’s impulsive approach. Before this war, Iran’s regime was weaker than at any time in its 47-year history: it could have fallen without a single American bomb. Trump may get lucky, but he is more likely to end up having to deal with regional chaos or a new hardliner. Surrounded by sycophantic courtiers, Trump has become rash in his second term. His opportunistic grabs for power whenever he sees weakness are dangerous. America needs a strategy in Iran, just as it needs one in the world.
