The deadly suicide attack on an imambargah in Islamabad during Friday prayers last week again exposed both the persistence of the terrorist threat and the troubling gaps in Pakistan’s internal security framework. While the swift arrest of four facilitators is a significant development, it does not absolve the state of responsibility for what was clearly a major security lapse. These are not questions that can be brushed aside. The public deserves clarity on how terrorism is being addressed, what went wrong and how similar attacks will be prevented in the future. Post-attack arrests, while necessary, cannot substitute for preventive action. There is now little ambiguity about the broader context in which such violence is unfolding. Pakistan has long maintained that hostile external actors, particularly India, are facilitating terrorist proxies to destabilise the country. From Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan, patterns of violence increasingly suggest coordination, financing and narrative amplification designed to create fear and project instability. These proxies are not interested in holding territory or engaging the state militarily; their objective is spectacle, perception and chaos.
At the same time, external facilitation alone does not explain the full picture. As Defence Minister Khawaja Asif rightly noted while addressing the National Assembly, internal elements are also being used to advance foreign agendas. This is a crucial point that demands honest introspection by the state. Why are some citizens vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist proxies? Is it the result of unaddressed political, economic or social grievances, or are these individuals motivated purely by financial incentives and criminal opportunism? Ignoring these questions only allows space for further exploitation. Mosques, imambargahs and other religious sites have repeatedly been targeted precisely because such attacks inflame sectarian tensions and fracture social cohesion. Protecting these spaces must therefore be treated as a national priority, not an episodic concern raised only after tragedy strikes.
Equally important is political unity. Pakistan’s experience over the past decade shows that counterterrorism efforts weaken whenever federal and provincial governments work at cross-purposes or use security failures as ammunition for political blame games. In this context, the recent coordination between the federal government and the KP administration is a welcome development. The meeting between the prime minister and KP Chief Minister Sohail Afridi, followed by a provincial apex committee session bringing together political leadership, the military and senior law-enforcement officials, signals an understanding that terrorism cannot be tackled in silos. The chief minister’s statement that the provincial government, the Pakistan Army and law-enforcement agencies are on the same page is significant, particularly given the history of mutual recrimination between the centre and KP on security matters. This shift is politically notable. In the past, disagreements between the PML-N and PTI often paralysed cooperation on national security. Even when consensus was sought on issues such as a charter of economy or counterterrorism, progress was frequently derailed by political posturing, especially during the tenure of Imran Khan, when engagement with political rivals was avoided at the cost of institutional coherence. That the KP government is now engaging constructively suggests that the gravity of the moment may finally be overriding partisan instincts. Pakistan cannot afford confusion, fragmentation or performative unity that dissolves once headlines fade. What is required is sustained cooperation between federal and provincial governments, continuous intelligence sharing and a clear political consensus that terrorism will not be used as a tool for point-scoring.
