The Kabul River Basin has emerged as the new front in the hydro-political chessboard where India’s growing involvement in Afghanistan’s water infrastructure threatens not only Pakistan’s water security but also the fragile equilibrium of regional peace. Behind the façade of development lies a calculated attempt to weaponise water as a tool of long-term leverage, reshaping hydrological realities to serve strategic ambitions.
India’s engagement in Afghanistan’s water sector has been neither altruistic nor apolitical. Through a combination of financial assistance, engineering expertise and covert technical support, New Delhi has steadily expanded its footprint across key Afghan river systems. Projects such as the Naghlu, Darunta and Shah wa Arus dams originally framed as development initiatives have transformed into geopolitical levers capable of regulating water flows into Pakistan. The $250 million Shahtoot Dam project near CharAsiab, for instance, will store 250 million cubic meters of water under the pretext of serving Kabul’s needs, but in effect, it will substantially reduce downstream availability to Pakistan. India’s actions mirror its pattern of unilateralism under the Indus Waters Treaty, where it continues to construct projects on western rivers allocated to Pakistan, tightening hydrological control from both the eastern and western flanks.
This twin-front water strategy marks a profound shift from hydro-diplomacy to hydro-politics, converting shared waters into instruments of coercion.
The recent visit of Afghanistan’s Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi deepened this dynamic. Reports suggest that Afghanistan sought $1 billion in Indian funding for the construction of new dams on the Kabul River and its tributaries a move that underlines both the Taliban’s economic dependence on India and India’s ambition to shape Afghanistan’s infrastructure agenda.
For Kabul, such projects provide domestic legitimacy and Indian patronage; for New Delhi, they represent an opportunity to extend its strategic reach into Pakistan’s water corridor. This continuity of Indo-Afghan cooperation under the Afghan Taliban regime dismantles the assumption that the group’s political ideology would preclude engagement with India.
The implications for Pakistan, particularly for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are severe and immediate. The Kabul River is the province’s lifeline sustaining agriculture, powering hydropower plants, and meeting urban water needs. Any upstream diversion or dam construction directly threatens this delicate balance. Reduced inflows will devastate irrigation networks across fertile districts such as Peshawar, Nowshera and Charsadda, undermining food production of vital crops like wheat and maize. Energy generation at installations such as Warsak Dam will decline, intensifying power shortages across KP. Urban centres already grappling with inadequate water supply will face deeper crises of scarcity and sanitation.
Beyond the economic fallout, the ecological repercussions could be irreversible wetlands drying up, groundwater depletion accelerating, and biodiversity declining. Afghanistan’s upstream actions, guided by Indian expertise and funding, thus strike at the heart of Pakistan’s economic resilience and human security.
This is not an isolated experiment. The Salma Dam precedent offers a cautionary lesson. Officially inaugurated as the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam in 2016, it curtailed flows into Iran’s Khorasan region, sparking diplomatic outrage. The project revealed India’s willingness to use water diplomacy as a geopolitical weapon and Afghanistan’s readiness to act unilaterally without consulting its neighbors. The Kabul River situation reflects an amplified version of this pattern. The Afghan Taliban’s approach seems less about national hydrological management and more about tactical bargaining: using water as leverage to pressure Islamabad on border management and counterterrorism issues.
In this evolving contest, Pakistan cannot afford complacency. Islamabad’s proposed Chitral River Diversion Project offers a rational and strategic response within the bounds of international law. By redirecting the Chitral River whose waters contribute roughly 51 per cent of Pakistan’s Kabul River inflow into the Swat Basin before it crosses into Afghanistan, Pakistan can safeguard a substantial portion of its resources. The project, often dubbed the ‘Tug of Waters’, promises dual benefits: generating up to 2,453MW of clean energy while enhancing irrigation capacity and flood control downstream. More importantly, it represents a proactive assertion of water sovereignty, ensuring that Pakistan’s hydrological future is not hostage to external manipulation.
The Afghan Taliban’s willingness to court Indian investment in upstream projects may yield short-term economic gain but will sow long-term regional discord. For Pakistan, the challenge is not only to protect its water resources but to transform this moment into an opportunity to strengthen internal conservation mechanisms, modernise irrigation and reassert its diplomatic leadership on transboundary water governance. Pakistan must treat the Kabul River not merely as a hydrological concern but as a pillar of national security integral to its stability, prosperity and identity.
The writer is a freelance contributor and writes on issues concerning national and regional security. She can be reached at: [email protected]
