Earlier this month, more than 80 metric tonnes of dried chillies from Pakistan arrived at the Chengdu International Railway Port. Packed into eight containers, the cargo had entered China through Qinzhou Port in Guangxi, then moved inland to Chengdu by a sea-rail intermodal service running under the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor.
TRADE POLICY
Earlier this month, more than 80 metric tonnes of dried chillies from Pakistan arrived at the Chengdu International Railway Port. Packed into eight containers, the cargo had entered China through Qinzhou Port in Guangxi, then moved inland to Chengdu by a sea-rail intermodal service running under the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor.
On the surface, spices crossing a border is an unremarkable agricultural transaction. Yet the shipment carries significance well beyond its weight in chillies. It was the first consignment to arrive in China under an agricultural cooperation project associated with CPEC and it offers a rare, concrete glimpse of what the next phase of Pakistan-China connectivity might actually look like.
Chillies destined for southwestern China have traditionally travelled through northern Chinese ports before being redistributed inland. This is an arrangement that adds handling, storage and time. The Qinzhou-Chengdu link changes that sequence as cargo now moves more directly from the coast to Sichuan's provincial capital, cutting delivery time by an estimated seven to 10 days and reducing logistics costs by roughly 1,000 yuan per metric tonne, according to figures cited by the Chengdu port authority.
More than 900 additional tonnes are reportedly already in transit, with the operator hoping to move the service towards regular, scheduled operation. None of this amounts to a new corridor built from scratch. It is, more precisely, a new logistics channel threaded through existing infrastructure: Qinzhou's port facilities, the land-sea trade corridor and Chengdu’s rail and bonded-warehousing network.
That distinction is worth dwelling on, because it points to where CPEC’s value is likely to be tested going forward. The first phase of the corridor was measured in kilometres of highway, megawatts of power and tonnes of cargo through Gwadar. Those remain necessary foundations. But infrastructure alone does not sell a farmer's crop in a foreign market. What the chilli shipment demonstrates — modestly and on a single commodity — is the harder, less photogenic work of connecting Pakistani producers to Chinese processors, distributors and retail chains.
This is the terrain that discussions of ‘CPEC 2.0’ increasingly point towards. As one can see, it involves not a rebranding of the corridor but a shift in emphasis from building connectivity to using it.
Chengdu’s role here is not incidental. Sichuan and Chongqing are among China’s most significant chilli-consuming markets, driven by a hotpot culture, a large condiment industry and a dense concentration of restaurants and food processors. China imported approximately 400,000 metric tonnes of dried chillies in 2025, with Pakistan, India and Myanmar among the leading suppliers.
The real test of the Pakistan-Chengdu chillies shipment will be if the route can be repeated often, reliably and cheaply enough to become a genuine export channel
Chengdu's railway port is also positioned as a logistics hub linking the land-sea corridor with China-Europe freight services, combining transport, bonded warehousing, trading and distribution functions in one location. For Pakistani exporters, the opportunity goes beyond a shorter shipping route to potential proximity to an integrated supply chain. This is the kind of arrangement that turns a one-off sale into a recurring commercial relationship.
It would be a mistake, however, to treat the arrival of eight containers as proof that Pakistan’s agricultural export problem is solved. Pakistan produces chillies, rice, mangoes and a range of other agricultural goods in substantial volume. But the constraint has rarely been production capacity alone. It has been everything that happens after harvest such as logistics costs, transit time, inconsistent supply, packaging standards, compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary requirements and the absence of durable links with Chinese buyers and processors.
A faster, cheaper route addresses one piece of that chain. It does not, by itself, guarantee reliable quality control, consistent volumes across seasons or the trading relationships needed to convert a pilot shipment into a standing export line. The gap between a successful first delivery and a commercially self-sustaining trade flow is where most such initiatives actually succeed or fail.
It is also worth resisting the temptation to frame this development as competition with Gwadar. Pakistan-China connectivity is an increasingly multi-route, multi-node system and not a single corridor to optimised. A new channel through Qinzhou and Chengdu need not diminish the case for Gwadar's own trade and transhipment ambitions.
Different routes serve different markets, commodities and cost structures. Having more than one option is itself a form of resilience for Pakistani exporters and not a zero-sum outcome.
The real test of this shipment will not be whether the story of Pakistani chillies reaching Chengdu makes for good headlines. It will be whether the route can be repeated often enough, reliably enough and cheaply enough to become a genuine export channel rather than a one-time demonstration. Whether the model, if it works and if it can be extended to other Pakistani commodities seeking a way into China’s interior markets is also important.
That is a considerably harder and slower proposition than moving eight containers once. But it is the proposition on which the next phase of CPEC will actually be judged.
The writer is a research associate at the Centre of Excellence for CPEC, Pakistan Institute of DevelopmentEconomics (PIDE).
